Georgia must adapt its national security strategies to counter not only traditional aggression but also the “gray zone operations” that threaten its sovereignty in this ongoing low-intensity conflict.
Improving Georgia’s security system and finding new approaches and solutions is a continuous process. And this is not surprising, because our region and the world have been in a constant state of change since our regained independence, with regional and global centers of power reorienting from time to time, new centers forming, military or political alliances expanding, shrinking or changing.
Additional risks and challenges arise from profound geopolitical, economic and social processes. This in turn requires continuous improvement of the national security system and appropriate adaptation to changing risks.
It is particularly noteworthy that anti-Georgian and anti-state actions have not always taken the form of open aggression. At the same time, it should be noted that encroachments on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country almost always take place within the framework of so-called “gray zone operations”, i.e. within the framework of measures that qualify the conflict as a “low-intensity conflict”.
In other words, even if the aggressor’s actions do not formally bear the signs of a declaration of war, their violent nature aims to weaken the target country’s defense capabilities, undermine its security and state foundations, and limit its scope for action and resources for the performance of national tasks.
In this case, therefore, there is no classic casus belli, but rather the aggressor’s subjecting the victim to its influence in a way (which may include, inter alia, neutralising appropriate international assistance or imposing significant restrictions on that assistance) that does not require the use of armed forces for the purpose of open aggression.
In other words, the purpose of “gray operations” in a “low” format is to weaken the state resilience of the target country and deplete its resources. The Center for Strategic and International Security interprets this phenomenon in a much more complex way, noting that such operations are “between routine management and open warfare” and that the initiator of “gray operations” seeks to exploit certain advantages in a way that “does not cross the line into open warfare.”
To simplify the problem even further, an attacker pursues a strategy aimed at achieving a desired economic, military, diplomatic and political outcome while avoiding a direct and costly response from the other side.
Such influence and pressure may involve restricting the target country’s access to a promising market of the aggressor (think of the closure of the Russian market to Georgian products at one point). The aggressor country may also seek to maximize the target country’s diplomatic isolation from third countries (such as China’s stance toward Taiwan).
Importantly, an aggressor country can refrain from using military units and rely entirely or partially on law enforcement agencies or other paramilitary structures to carry out “gray” or “less intensive” operations. In addition, certain civilian resources can be used for this purpose. All this makes it possible to “push the limits” when conducting a violent campaign, which in turn reduces the possibilities for adequate legal qualification and countermeasures under international law.
What can we do about it? What should we be interested in?
As for the response of the Georgian side, we envisage three categories of so-called defensive barriers: one at the national level, the second in coordination with our international partners, and the third the implementation of measures to increase the geo-economic function and usefulness of the country.
At the national level, “low intensity” operations typically target and will continue to target Georgian air, sea and economic space.
In the air and sea space, the introduction of modern surveillance systems remains a priority. This primarily involves low-cost drones and corresponding sensors, which are necessary for the timely detection of intruders into Georgian air and sea space and the development of the necessary countermeasures.
Of particular importance is the improvement of the Georgian military-industrial complex and the fulfillment of at least the basic requirements for effective monitoring. It is also necessary to further improve the capabilities of the Georgian Coast Guard and bring them closer to modern standards.
Given the economic ecosystem as the cornerstone of any effective security system and in the context of growing economic nationalism in the world, not only the quantity of investments is important, but also their quality.
Therefore, given the current threats, we consider it unacceptable to consider any investment as desirable for our country. It is time to learn how to distinguish and select them. To this end, we consider it advisable to review investments and introduce a screening mechanism by law. We should also note that many developed economies use this method today.
In addition, the issue of economic security should be given a large and separate place in Georgia’s national security doctrine. This special attention is, in turn, dictated by the modern and multifaceted understanding of the concept of “security”. Let us agree that national security is unthinkable without a unified package of economic measures, because no one will consider and negotiate with a weak, poor country with constant requests for help.
It is particularly important to note that the dimension of economic security should be strengthened within the framework of the National Security Council. As one of the possible developments, we do not exclude the separate creation of an Economic Security Council or its institutionalization within the framework of the National Security Council. In addition, as far as the structural approach is concerned, we also consider the introduction of the position of Minister for Economic Security in the Georgian government with appropriate supervisory powers and functions as a possible topic for discussion.
In any case, one of the fundamental tasks, whether under the auspices of the Economic Security Council or the Minister of Economic Security, should be the continuous monitoring and analysis of risks and threats to Georgia’s economic security, and this process should be objectively reflected in a periodic economic threat document. In addition to the structural approach, the feasibility of legislation to ensure economic security (such as Georgia’s “Law on Economic Security”) should also be discussed.
Measures of international importance
From this perspective, the Georgian side’s efforts should be focused even more on the Black Sea factor, which represents both a major challenge and a major opportunity from a geopolitical and security perspective.
Focusing on the geopolitical component, we nevertheless want to put forward the initiative for a framework document of the Black Sea Declaration, which would serve the political and economic integration of the countries of the region, including a modern consultation format adapted to the times and the need for new communication channels.
Such a declaration will highlight the importance of the Black Sea region for peace and stability in the world and in the region. Regarding a number of important issues, this document will underline, to name a few, the need to mobilize investment resources for the diversification of regional infrastructure, the need to implement socially and environmentally sustainable projects in the region, and outline the direction of regional free trade agreements and blocs.
As for the security dimension in the Black Sea, we envisage a corresponding cooperation (similar to NORDEFCO or another model) between NATO member countries (Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria) and non-member countries (Georgia, Ukraine). Such a platform would be helpful, among other things, to discuss security and defence policies and identify common risks and challenges, as well as to enable joint actions to ensure peace and stability in the Black Sea region.
Overall, the creation of a mini-alliance in the Black Sea is all the more important when one considers that NATO’s presence in the Black Sea has been characterized by a significant lack of potential and resources in recent years. Moreover, this lack of forces on the eastern flank of the Alliance’s perimeter – from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea – has been exacerbated by an obvious asymmetry or inequality.
Last but not least, special importance is attached to strengthening Georgia’s relations with Western partners. In our opinion, one of the real manifestations of this cooperation is the creation in Tbilisi of a special joint center of expertise to combat hybrid warfare and disinformation in the form of an analogue of the Center for Combating Hybrid Threats operating in Helsinki. In parallel with neutralizing hybrid disinformation manifestations in our country, such a center will also be able to respond to regional problems.
Strengthening the geoeconomic function
We believe that increasing a country’s usefulness in a network of regional trade, transport or other types of economic linkages and the shared interest and responsibility of the actors who have a say in realising these benefits will help to better manage and mitigate future risks.
The approach described above formed the basis for the cross-border projects that Georgia launched in the 1990s (Baku-Supsa, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and later Baku-Tbilisi-Kars), which gave our country ‘its own self’ in the eyes of the outside world.
However, one must remember that strengthening one’s “self” and filling it with new content is a constant, continuous process, in which fatigue and boredom are impossible. A number of large-scale projects, including the Middle Corridor and the Black Sea cable, which should give Georgia a unique role in the larger regional geo-economic structure for at least a few decades, serve precisely this purpose.
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