Earlier this month, on August 1, a controversial “Foreign Influence Transparency” law came into force in Georgia. The law subjects civic groups that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to overly strict controls, labeling them “organizations pursuing the interests of a foreign power.” This applies to both local civil society organizations and the media. The organizations are subject to burdensome and disproportionate reporting requirements and sanctions for non-compliance. The state authorities’ extensive control powers have a chilling effect and can stifle and shut down organizations critical of the government. For more details, see here.
From protests to acceptance
A similar bill was withdrawn last year after massive protests. Opponents of the law pointed out that it was based on a similar law from 2012 in Russia and could be used to suppress civil society groups.
When the Georgian government resubmitted the bill in April 2024, breaking its promise not to introduce any more such legislation, it sparked mass protests again – the largest the country had seen since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The parliamentary process saw scuffles in the national parliament. Georgia’s allies also warned that the bill would suppress hard-won freedoms and hinder the country’s path to European Union membership.
In response, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition launched a coordinated campaign to discredit local civil society actors, the media and the donors that support them – primarily the US and the EU. This marked a clear turning point towards openly anti-European and anti-Western rhetoric.
Anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric
Since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Georgian government has been trying to create a balanced image between being pro-Western and not openly anti-Kremlin. Opposition parties have repeatedly accused Georgian Dream of being too close to the Kremlin. But with the controversy over the foreign agent law flaring up in 2023 and again this spring, this balance seems to be tipping. Of course, the ruling party is inclined to be somewhat nervous given the heated and polarized political climate in Georgia and the upcoming parliamentary elections next October.
Georgian Dream representatives and pro-government experts now appear to be joining common Kremlin arguments to discredit the EU and those civil society and political forces in Georgia that want to keep the country on a pro-European course. There is “convincing evidence that government actors are spreading disinformation and propaganda to discredit civil society organizations, media and the opposition,” said Nino Dolidze, a civil activist, in an interview with EUvsDisinfo.
Officials and commentators accused the EU of seeking to destabilise the country as part of a “regime change” agenda, vilifying the protesters with false claims that they were directed from abroad to provoke a “colour revolution” in Georgia. Some media outlets attempted to claim that the protests were organised by the US embassy in Tbilisi. The People Power movement, a close ally of Georgian Dream, labelled European diplomats as instruments of the “global war party” seeking to initiate a “Maidanisation process” in Georgia and draw the country into Russia’s war against Ukraine. This, it claimed, would serve to open a “second front” in the West’s war against Russia. Such claims of a “second front” and “colour revolutions” have long been among the Kremlin’s favourite narratives to discredit EU foreign policy.
“Maidanization”
A notable example of these narratives is POSTV, a well-known pro-government propaganda channel that produced a series of documentaries aimed at discrediting the protests and defaming participants, including civil rights activists, youth groups and NGOs. These films suggested that the protests were orchestrated from abroad and spread the idea that Western powers were defying the Foreign Influence Act to conceal their secret funding of various groups in Georgia. The ultimate goal? To destabilize the country and overthrow the democratic government – a Euromaidan scenario.
“Corrupt EU”
Pro-government media in Georgia and elsewhere enthusiastically seized on and amplified the outrage of Georgian Dream officials and commentators. According to Dolidze, “the disinformation we saw before came mainly from within the country, but since last year the manipulative networks we encountered came not from Georgia but from Russia.”
To reinforce the Georgian Dream message, pro-government media added the Kremlin’s usual disinformation narratives, claiming, among other things, that the West is “corrupt” and that the EU is trying to impose its decadent values on healthier, more traditional societies. They claimed that the EU was spreading LGBTQI+ propaganda in Georgia and pressuring the government to normalize homosexuality and legalize same-sex marriage. They also claimed that EU membership would force Georgia to accept “depravity.”
The EU in particular became the target of such disinformation after High Representative Josep Borrell and EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi warned that the draft law did not meet EU standards and would complicate Georgia’s path to the EU. The EU then suspended €30 million in support for Georgia’s armed forces and announced that it would “review direct aid to the government, while ensuring continued support for civil society and independent media in the country”. The EU also described the current actions of the Georgian authorities as jeopardising Georgia’s path to the EU and leading to a de facto “halt” of the accession process. Contrary to the claims of Georgian Dream officials, the “Foreign Influence Transparency” law has actually pushed Georgia further away from the EU than before its adoption.
We have seen how quickly media messaging can change in response to political developments. In the case of Georgia, this was clearly driven by officials and pro-government commentators. In the interests of the Georgian people, there is a need to move away from confrontation and towards more constructive language.
